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A PRELIMINARY TEST OF NEUTRALITY
War creates no more perplexing international problems than
those involving the relations between belligerents and neutrals.
In times of peace the mutual relations of sovereign states are
built upon the basis of complete reciprocity. The course of con-
duct which one nation has the right to expect and demand that
other nations shall observe toward itself, is identical with that
which it is its own duty to observe toward all other nations.
Upon the outbreak of war reciprocity necessarily fails as the
standard by which the relations between neutrals and belligerents
can be measured. Manifestly the duties which a neutral owes
to a belligerent and the -duties owed by the belligerent to the
neutral are of a very different character. From this dissimilarity
arises most of the difficulty attending a satisfactory adjustment
of disputes between countries of the two classes. Justice based
upon uniformity is of easy theoretical attainment; justice based
upon mutual concessions between divergent interests is more
difficult of attainment. In spite, however, of the difficulties in
the way of the establishment of a fair equilibrium there can be
no satisfactory solution of any of the problems concerning the
relations between belligerents and neutrals which is not predi-
cated upon the recognition of the principle that each has rights
upon the high seas and elsewhere which the other is bound to
respect.
It was long before belligerents could be induced to admit that
neutrals possessed any rights which it was their duty to recog-
nize. In early times the right of a belligerent to prey upon com-
merce which in any way benefited its opponents was virtually
unrestricted, even although it extended to the seizure of the ships
and cargoes of neutrals.
"The truth is that the Law of Neutrality is a compara-
tively modern growth, in so far as it deals with the mutual
rights and duties of belligerent and neutral states. It has
arisen during the last century from a recognition, dim at
first but growing clearer and clearer as time went on, of
the two principles of absolute impartiality on the part of
neutrals and absolute respect for neutral sovereignty on
the part of belligerents. But in so far as it deals with
the right df belligerent states to put restraint on the com-
merce of neutral individuals, it is at least as old as the
maritime codes of the Middle Ages, and in some of its
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provisions traces can be found of the sea laws of the
Greeks and the Romans. Opposing self-interests are the
operative forces which have determined the character of
this part of the Law of Neutrality. At first the powers
at war were able to impose hard conditions upon peaceful
merchants. It was a favor for them to be allowed to
trade at all, and they were not permitted to do anything
that would impede the operations of the belligerents.
Then, as commerce became stronger, concession after con-
cession was won for neutral traders; and neutral states
made common cause to protect their subjects from moles-
tations they deemed unwarrantable. ' The nineteenth cen-
tury has seen the removal of many of the remaining
shackles, and it can hardly be doubted that others will soon
be struck off."'
The present attitude of belligerents toward neutrals, while a
great improvement over the earlier attitude, still leaves much to
be desired. On the other hand, neutrals are at times inclined to
deny the just rights of belligerents. While an enlightened sys-
tem of International Law should undoubtedly favor neutrals to
the greatest possible extent, it must also recognize the due rights
of belligerents; and the right of a neutral to demand proper
treatment from a belligerent must always to a great degree be
dependent upon the neutral's observance of its own duties. A
neutral is only entitled to the rights of neutrals when it recog-
nizes and performs the obligations of neutrals.
Furthermore, it is only by the strict observance of the rules
governing the duties of neutrals to belligerents, that a neutral
avoids the risk of being on the wrong side of a claim for dam-
ages; for the liability of a belligerent to account in damages
for injuries inflicted upon a neutral by its violation of a belliger-
ent's duties toward neutrals is no clearer than is the liability for
damages of a neutral to a belligerent where the former has been
guilty of a violation of its duties toward the latter.
It is therefore evident that a neutral which desires to be in a
position to successfully assert all its rights as against belliger-
ents must study not only the extent of these rights, but also the
nature and extent of its duties to the belligerents.
The first and greatest of these duties is that of being neutral;
and by neutrality can only be meant absolute neutrality. There is,
and can be, no other form of neutrality. International Law
knows nothing of the "qualified neutrality" sometimes referred
'Lawrence's Principles of International Law, p. 476.
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to by International Law writers of an earlier day, or of the
"benevolent neutrality" which has first come into prominence
during the present war. Any departure from a policy of strict
non-discrimination between belligerents destroys the true neu-
trality of a nation.
Justice requires that the conduct not only of belligerents
toward neutrals, but also that of neutrals towards belligerents,
shall be determined by fixed legal principles. It is in the storm-
iest waters that there is the greatest need of accurate steering;
and it is during times of warfare, when the rules of Interna-
tional Law are most apt to be disregarded, that there is the
greatest need of strict adherence to these principles. The ques-
tion next naturally arises as to what these principles of Interna-
tional Law are which should guide a neutral in framing its
conduct toward belligerents. To attempt even an enumeration of
all the rules necessary for the determination of each problem of
this character which can arise would be an impossibility in a
short article of this character.
There is, however, one preliminary rule which can be laid
down which will furnish an accurate preliminary test of neutral-
ity, and which in most cases will indicate the road which it is
necessary to follow in order to arrive at the solution of any con-
crete question which may be presented to a neutral relative to
its conduct toward a belligerent.
This test is to be found in the strict application of the prin-
ciple that it is the duty of every neutral to govern all its actions
which in any manner affect the interests of any of the belliger-
ents, by the rules of International Law, as they existed at the
time of the breaking out of the war. No neutral country has
the right to attempt to modify the rules of International Law
during the continuance of hostilities, nor to acquiesce in any
attempt of the belligerents on one side to so change them. A
neutral, during the continuance of hostilities, cannot act as an
international law maker nor can a neutral while retaining an
attitude of strict neutrality properly assume to pass upon the
merits of the controversy being settled by the test of arms, nor
give as an excuse for refusing to follow the existing rules of
law, that in its opinion its adherence to these rules would work
for the benefit of one or other of the belligerents. The adoption
of the theory that any principle of International Law which
works to the advantage of either belligerent must be suspended
would mean the suspension of all International Law during the
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continuance of hostilities. What every belligerent is entitled to,
and all that any belligerent has any right to ask, is that the war
shall be fought out under the rules which existed at the time of
the outbreak of hostilities.
An exception to this rule may perhaps seem to be found in an
episode which occurred in that group of wars of which the
American Revolution formed a part, when the principal neutral
countries of Europe, by entering into the covenant known as the
"Armed Neutrality" (and which embodied a demand for the
recognition of the principles of maritime law which the Empress
Catherine II of Russia in a proclamation issued March 8, 1780,
had announced that she was henceforth resolved to defend by
force if necessary), succeeded in having certain entirely new
principles incorporated into the body of International Law.
This exception, however, is much more apparent than real.
As a matter of fact the so-called "armed" neutrality, like every
other kind of neutrality which requires an adjective to define it,
was in reality no neutrality, at all. It was a threat of hostility
which succeeded because the country against which it was prin-
cipally directed feared to take on any new antagonists. As a
prominent historian has expressed it: "This covenant, known
as the Armed Neutrality, was practically a threat aimed at Eng-
land, and through her unwillingness to alienate Russia it proved
a very effective threat."
The truth of the statement that the duty of a neutral is to
closely observe the existing principles of International Law
(including rules not of universal acceptance which have become
binding upon the particular neutral, through its previous actions)
is more readily seen if the proposition is put in its negative form
and the question is asked: under what conditions a neutral coun-
try will be liable for the losses occasioned to a belligerent coun-
try (or its citizens or subjects) by the acts of the neutral. The
answer is obviously that a neutral country can never be so liable
except in cases where its action upon which the claim for dam-
ages is based, has constituted a violation of some existing prin-
ciple of International Law. For losses resulting from any of
their acts-either of commission or omission-which constituted
such a violation, neutrals may and have been held liable to bellig-
erents for the damages resulting therefrom.
Much light is thrown upon the basis upon which the liability
of a neutral to a belligerent.may be predicated by a study of the
negotiations between the United States and Great Britain leading
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up to the arbitration of the "Alabama" claims. The history of
these negotiations reveals what is perhaps the most anomalous
situation ever found in any important international arbitration.
The principles involved were considered by both countries as
being of far greater importance than the indemnity finally
awarded, and for this reason great difficulty was experienced in
so framing the questions to be presented to the arbitrators for.
their consideration as not to put any stigma upon the conduct of
either country. With regard to the legal questions involved the
two countries disagreed upon every vital point except upon this
preliminary principle, that the liability of Great Britain must be
based-if it existed at all-upon the law as it existed at the
time of the outbreak of the war.
The British commissioners who negotiated the Treaty of
Washington, by the provisions of which the "Alabama" claims
were submitted to arbitration, soon indicated that they were
much less opposed to the payment by Great Britain of an indem-
nity to the United States, as compensation for the losses occa-
sioned by the seizure and destruction of American ships by the
"Alabama," than they were to an admission that there had been
a violation of the principles of International Law on the part of
Great Britain.
The United States commissioners proposed the adoption of
certain rules which the arbitrators should be obliged to take as
the principles of International Law governing the case. To this
proposal it was replied by
"the British Commissioners that they were instructed to
declare that they could not assent to the proposed rules
as a statement of principles of international law, but that
Her Majesty's Government, in order to evince its desire
of strengthening the friendly relations between the two
countries, and of making satisfactory provision for the
future, agreed that in deciding the questions between the
two countries arising out of those claims the arbitrator
should assume that Her Majesty's Government had under-
taken to act upon the principles set forth in the rules inquestion. 1'
2
The matter was thus settled under a compromise by which the
British Government agreed that it should be "assumed" by the
arbitrators that certain rules of law were binding- upon Great
'Moore's International Arbitrations, Vol. I, p. 543.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Britain while that country expressly refused to "assent" or
acknowledge that these rules had been actually binding upon her.
Article VI of the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which set
forth the rules to be followed by the arbitrators, and explained
the theory of the British Government as to their adoption, was
in part as follows:
"In deciding the matters submitted to the Arbitrators
they shall be governed by the following three rules, which
are agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as rules
to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such princi-
ples of International Law not inconsistent therewith as
the Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to
the case: Rules- . . Her Britannic Majesty has
commanded her High Commissioners and Plenipoten-
tiaries to declare that Her Majesty's Government cannot
assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of the prin-
ciples of International Law which were in force at the
time when the claims mentioned in Article I arose, but
that Her Majesty's Government in order to evince its
desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the
two countries and of making satisfactory provision for the
future, agrees that in deciding the questions between the
two countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators
should assume that Her Majesty's Government had under-
taken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.
And the High Contracting Parties agree to observe
these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring
them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers, and to
invite them to accede to them."
There was, therefore, never any agreement between the United
States and Great Britain as to the theory under which the "Ala-
bama" award was made, even after the arbitrators had rendered
their decision and the award had been paid.
The position of the United States was always that the award
was made for damages resulting from the failure of Great
Britain to observe the duties imposed upon her as a neutral, if
not by the general principles of International Law, at least by
her own municipal regulations. The British Government on the
other hand never at any time admitted that the rules under which
the award was made were binding upon Great Britain at the
time of the Civil War, and held that she merely agreed that cer-
tain new principles of International Law should have a retro-
active effect.3
'The result of the award was accepted with general acquiescence in
England on account of the general prevailing feeling in that country that
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Both countries, however, proceeded on the theory that a basis
must be found to sustain the "Alabama" award either in princi-
ples of International Law which actually existed during the
Civil War period, or in principles which it was agreed between
the two countries the arbitrators might arbitrarily assume to
have existed at that time.
No legal principle is broad enough to cover every case, and
the rule that a neutral must observe the law as it existed at the
outbreak of the war necessarily fails when confronted with some
new problem of neutrality concerning which no binding rule of
International Law has ever been adopted. In this connection it
may be said that cases involving questions of International Law
relative to the conduct of neutrals toward belligerents, fall into
three classes:
First. Cases where the question as to the proper conduct
of the neutral in some specific matter is covered by some -rule of
International Law fully established and universally recognized
at the time of the outbreak of the war. In all such cases there
can be no legitimate ground for doubt as to the proper action of
the neutral; it is manifestly and absolutely its duty to strictly
follow the recognized rule of International Law regardless of
the effect of such action upon the fortunes of any of the bellig-
erents.
Second. Equally plain is the duty of the neutral to follow
the precedents which it has itself established in cases where ques-
tions are involved upon which there can not be said to be any
generally accepted rule of International Law, but upon which
the neutral nation has definitely committed itself by the conduct
or decisions of its Executive or Judicial Department acting
within the proper scope of its authority. This proposition is of
especial importance in the United States on account of the many
occasions upon which our Supreme Court, in its decisions, has
asserted principles of International Law not accepted by the
majority of other nations. In times of war between other coun-
tries this country, to be either consistent or just, must adhere to
such of these decisions as affect the duties of neutrals toward
belligerents, except in cases where the position taken by the
Great Britain had secured the adoption of a new principle of International
Law liable to be of great benefit to her in the future, by permitting it to
be made retroactive adversely to British interests in a single controversy.
This might serve as an illustration of the old saying that during one
war England is always fighting the next.
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Supreme Court was subsequently abandoned, prior to the open-
ing of the war, by international agreement or otherwise.
Third. During the course of a long war questions will neces-
sarily be presented to a neutral which are not to be answered
by any of the generally accepted principles of International Law
and upon which the neutral country has never committed itself
prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In such cases, and in such
cases only, there seems to be no sure test which can be used as
the standard by which to measure the quality of the neutrality
exercised.
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